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At first glance, the current Court's decisions in criminal cases may
appear to be examples of "judicial passivism," casting many issues out of its
own view and committing them to the discretion of other actors in the
criminal justice system. A closer examination, however, begins to unveil a
more result-oriented agenda since the only issues banished from view are
ones historically of service to accused persons; this abdication of the Court's
role is engaged in only when the Court can be confident that those other
actors (police, states, lower federal courts) will "get it right" and convict
defendants. Indeed, this so-called "passive" Court has generated new
suspiciously activist theories pressing heretofore irrelevant facts into the
service of diminishing the constitutional guarantees of persons accused of
crime. In short, the Court's jurisprudence in the criminal area may have
much less to do with its philosophy of judging than with its politics of crime
control.
To demonstrate my thesis, I offer three pieces of evidence: (1) a
comparison between the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule and
a 1996 decision on pretext arrests; (2) recent Court decisions on when a
"seizure" occurs, including a spectacular 1998 case which reaches a
conclusion you will find fantastic (in the original sense of that word); and
(3) this Court's basic jurisprudential tool for deciding difficult crime-
connected constitutional questions-the "totality of the circumstances" test.
One more introductory note is important. Our complex of interests in
enforcing the criminal law firmly (our "crime control" interest) is in
constant, creative tension with the constellation of interests in treating
accused persons fairly (the "due process" interest).1 It is not as if we have
* This speech was delivered on October 5, 1998 (the first Monday).
** Louis & Anna Seegers Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; Yale
University (LL.M., 1978); Valparaiso University (B.A., 1965; LL.B. 1967).
'The polestar work in understanding the criminal process as an admixture of two models--the
"crime control" model and the "due process" model-is Herbert L. Packer's, Two Models of the
Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L.REV. 1 (1964).
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to choose sides here, though the press often likes to play it that way;
instead, we each want, in varying degrees, both interests served. Thus, the
politics of "crime control" versus "due process" ebbs and flows with public
opinion and may even ebb and flow within ourselves. But as an institution,
the Supreme Court is not just a mediator of that tension, for it has been
made the special guardian of those fundamental rights which together
make up the "due-process" interest. When we find the Court pulling too
strongly toward the crime-control side, we need to understand that it not
only tips its hand as to its political sentiment but abandons one of its
principal reasons for existence.
II. "GOOD FAITH" AND "PRETEXT"
In 1961, the Warren Court, generally reckoned to be among history's
most activist courts, held in Mapp v. Ohio2 that henceforth state courts could
not accept in criminal prosecutions any evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, that is, through an illegal search or seizure (and keep
in mind that a seizure might be a seizure of goods or a seizure of a person-
an arrest). This "exclusionary rule" of Mapp together with Miranda v.
Arizona3 on custodial interrogation techniques and Gideon v. Wainwright4 on
indigents' right to counsel, formed the centerpiece of what is often called
"the Warren Court revolution."
In 1984, in the companion cases, United States v. Leon 5 and Massachusetts
v. Sheppard,6 the Court (now, of course, the Burger Court and on the brink
of becoming the Rehnquist Court) created a new exception to the exclusion
of evidence obtained illegally when the police can be shown to have
operated in "good faith." Bear in mind that in each of these two cases, the
arrest or search in question was, the Court found, illegal. (In Leon, the arrest
was made without probable cause while in Sheppard, the search was
conducted pursuant to a warrant which did not sufficiently particularize the
items to be seized). Yet, in both cases, the Court stated that, the
constitutional violation notwithstanding, excluding the evidence would be
inappropriate because the police had acted reasonably; the mistakes were
made by judges, not the police themselves. In 1995, this "good faith"
exception was utilized to save an arrest made in reliance on computerized
information inaccurately maintained by the court clerk's office. 7 The Court
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
'468 U.S. 897 (1984).
6 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
7 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
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noted that had the police been responsible for maintaining the computer
records, the seizure would have led to inadmissible evidence. Only two
current justices voted against the outcome in this case, so the "good-faith
exception" can be fairly characterized as the strong stance of the current
Court. What drives this good-faith doctrine is a belief that the state of the
police officer's mind is relevant in determining how constitutional rights are
protected. Even though there is an admitted constitutional violation, the
individual policeman's "good faith" eliminates the principal remedy for a
Fourth Amendment violation.8
Now, this has never made total sense to me. The police officer's
personal intention-his mens rea, if you will-would surely be important if
we were punishing him, but why should it matter in the defendant's
criminal prosecution when it can be shown that someone else in
government has engaged in behavior which violated the defendant's
constitutionally protected right?9 But, never mind. Let's take the Court at
its word here; the police officer's personal "good faith" matters.
Enter Whren v; United States10 in 1996. For many years, arrests and
searches had been invalidated when defendants could show that an actual,
if technical, violation of law was used to effect an arrest which was, in
reality, a pretext to search for evidence of some other crime. Indeed, earlier
decisions had routinely invalidated police procedures that were avowed to
be for a legitimate purpose when it could be shown that they were being
conducted purely for an illegitimate one. For example, police can inventory
impounded vehicles for safety and administrative reasons, principally to
safeguard valuables contained in the vehicle. But if a given police
department inventories only those impounded cars they suspect may
contain drugs, it betrays that the "real" reason for the search is not
safeguarding but crime detection; the Court does not accept the fruits of
these searches. 11 Or, in the common pretextual arrest pattern, police,
'The matter really begins to get zany when one tries to determine exactly what remedy would
be available to the defendant. A tort or § 1983 action is a bad candidate given that the only
available candidates for defendant are the police officer and the judge. The police officer is, by
hypothesis, acting in good faith, so he or she has a defense. And the judge has complete
immunity fpr this kind of judicial action. The victim of the constitutional violation has a right,
but no remedy, whatever that means.
9 As a matter of fact, a systemic remedy like exclusion is the ideal remedy for violations by
persons so embedded in the system that immunities designed for the system's protection covers
them.
'0 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
11 See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
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desiring to get a look into x's car in transit because they have a suspicion of
contraband in the car, but not enough suspicion to justify stopping the car,
might experience a sudden intense interest in enforcing a statutory policy
that all cars have working license-plate lights.
In the Whren case, plainclothes vice officers in an unmarked car were
patrolling a "high drug area" of Washington, D.C., and their suspicions were
aroused by a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary plates, a vehicle being
driven and occupied by young black males.12 Desiring any excuse to look
inside the vehicle, they paid close attention to it. They noted that the driver
stopped for an inordinate time at a stop sign, looked down at the lap of one
of the occupants and then, upon seeing the officers, turned left without
signaling.13 The officers pursued and pulled the truck over.14 Now it is a
good bet that these officers had not made an honest-to-goodness traffic
arrest since they shed their uniforms. Indeed, D.C. Municipal Police
regulations prohibited plainclothes officers in unmarked cars from making
any traffic stops except in the case of a "violation that is so grave as to pose
an immediate threat to the safety of others."1I5 As the officers approached
the truck, one officer immediately saw two large plastic bags of what
appeared to be crack cocaine. 16 The occupants were arrested and a search
of the car turned up more illegal drugs. 17 The case is the paradigm of a
pretextual arrest; we know that the police would not have made the stop
but for their interest in searching for drugs (for which they admittedly had
no probable cause). In a 7-2 ruling, the Court upheld the search. The
logical path of the holding is simple: (1) the driver violated a traffic law and
was subject to valid arrest; and (2) during the course of a valid arrest, police
found contraband in "plain view." But what about the pretextual nature of
the arrest? Justice Scalia's opinion for the court includes this language:
We think [prior cases] foreclose any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on
the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.
. . . Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.18
Well, they certainly play a role when they are in "good faith!" It is only the
'bad faith" motivations which are pressed out of view.
12 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).
13Id.
14 Id.
1- Id. at 815.
16 Id. at 808-09.
17 Id at 809.
18 Id. at 812.
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To be fair, I must stress that I do not claim that the good-faith cases and
the pretext case are inconsistent with each other. They fit under different
paths of analysis (one is a substantive rule, one a rule about a remedial
response) and have distinctly different lineages. The law is full of instances
where you can pull one case each out of two totally different conceptual
paths and make them look silly by comparing them in isolation. But such
a burlesque is not my intention. My claim is only that these cases should
cause us to hesitate before denominating this Court "activist" or "passivist."
A passivist Court would not embark on a new sojourn questing for "good
faith." An activist court would not sweep "bad faith" under the rug. But a
Court firmly committed to crime control could consistently develop both
the "good-faith" line and the "pretext" line of cases, as this Court has done.
III. THE "SEIZURE" CASES
Two recent decisions on when a "seizure" of a person occurs
demonstrate this Court's tendency to press critical constitutional issues out
of judicial view entirely, thereby committing the decision to the police not
only in the first instance but permanently and exclusively. In the 1991
decision California v. Hodari D. 19 police pulled up and got out of their
prowler near a group of young black males. Many of them, including
Hodari D., broke and ran.20 Officer Pertoso gave chase to arrest Hodari
though the State admits that there was no legal basis for any imposition of
custody, be it a full-blown arrest or an investigative "stop."21 During the
chase, Hodari jettisoned something.22 After Pertoso physically tackled
Hodari, he walked back and determined that Hodari had dropped crack
cocaine, for which he was then prosecuted.23 The Court understands that
if Hodari's actions of exposing the crack were produced by an unlawful
seizure, its use as evidence would be disallowed under the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine, an offshoot of the exclusionary rule.24 But the
Court holds 7-2 that the exposure of criminal evidence happened before the
seizure, a seizure which the Court dates from the physical capture, and not
from when Pertoso gave chase.25 As the dissent points out, all of Hodari's
actions (and regardless of what you think of them, put yourself in the
9' 499 U.S. 621 (1991).




24 Id. at 624.
25 Id. at 629.
Berner: Criminal Procedure in the Current Term
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998
28 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
position of a black teenager in Los Angeles for whom the arrival of white
policeman seldom augers free ice cream or even pleasant inquiries) are
reactions to an attempted seizure.26 The State admits as much. Why then
doesn't the Fourth Amendment mean that the police may not attempt an
illegal seizure? When someone attempts bank robbery, we do not excuse
their actions entirely simply because they are unsuccessful. We convict
them of attempt and, as a matter of fact, today the penalty for attempted
robbery is, in most states, roughly the same as for robbery. The police can,
under the Court's rule, prompt all sorts of reactions from citizens by scaring
them and then engaging in what the dissent calls a "sufficiently slow chase."
To have a seizure, holds the Court, there must either be the application of
physical force which sticks (i.e., the suspect does not break free and run) or
there must be a governmental show of authority to which the suspect
submits.27
The irony of that "sufficiently slow chase" prediction came to full
flower this past term in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.28 Officer Smith and
partner hailed a motorcycle driver to pull over because the driver had been
speeding.29 The driver (Willard), who carried a passenger (Lewis),
maneuvered away from police and took off at high speed with Officer
Smith now in high-speed pursuit.30 The chase consumed 75 seconds, 1.3
miles, and achieved speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour (mph),
whereupon the motorcycle tipped over and deposited Lewis on the
roadway where Officer Smith (accidentally) ran over him and killed him.31
Lewis' heirs brought an action against the County under section 1983
claiming, inter alia, that the death was caused during an unreasonable
arrest-an unreasonable "seizure." The theory of plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment case here is not that the police had no right to arrest Willard-
he had been speeding-but that effectuating the arrest of a minor traffic
violater by engaging him in a 100-mph chase is unreasonable. It does not
really matter how you, I, or the Court would come out on this question
because, as one sees from Hodari, the Court isn't about to get it. No seizure
had as yet taken place while the chase was on, only an attempted seizure.
Well, when the officers slammed into Lewis, surely that was a seizure,
2 Id. at 629-48.
21 Interestingly enough, if the suspect does submit, this opens the way for an argument that the
suspect is consenting to the confrontation and is not really "seized" but is voluntarily complying
with a police request. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). If you or I, for example,
stop to have a friendly conversation with a policeman, we are not "seized" under the Fourth
Amendment.
28 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998).
29 Id. at 1712.
3 Id.
31 Id.
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right? "No," said the Court. The chase was only an attempted seizure, and
the physical slamming into him was unintentional. To have a "seizure," there
must be physical force "intentionally applied." So the police had slammed
into Lewis at 100 mph and killed him, but they had not "seized" him. Lewis
died a free man.
Now what is the effect of taking the early phase of police-suspect
confrontation out of the Fourth Amendment's view? For one thing, it means
the Court cannot reach important social/legal questions such as what the
limits of high-speed police chases should be. That debate is controversial,
to be sure, but it is a debate worth having. Perhaps it can be argued that the
debate should go on in forums other than a constitutional court. Perhaps
the legislatures should take this question up and prescribe limits.
Legislatures, if they function properly, will probably resolve this question
consonant with majoritarian impulses. But why isn't this precisely the kind
of question that the Framers had in mind for the counter-majoritarian
branch when they committed the question of "unreasonable seizures" to it
under the Fourth Amendment?
The second effect of the Hodari-Lewis doctrine, of course, is to leave the
issue in the hands of the police. Does the Court do that with any mystery
whatsoever as to how the police will resolve close questions? Is it really
judicial passivism or is it really judicial activism with a dodge? If I am
asked to arbitrate a dispute between x and y and my decision is: "I choose
to be passive and to accept the decision that x will announce," I have in fact
decided the case. And the special bonus I receive is that I do not have to
appear to have a position on the merits of a very touchy dispute. I can still
claim to have the "passive virtues."
The earliest stages of police-suspect confrontation are the most
important. If there is one eternal reality we learn from defense counsel it is
that a criminal case is often lost well before the lawyer gets involved. Yale
Kamisar many years ago wrote an influential article about the "gatehouse"
of the criminal justice system and the "mansionhouse. 32 The gatehouse was
the police station where suspects were coerced, tricked, and sometimes even
brutalized into confessing. Then the trial was conducted in the
mansionhouse and had all the trappings of fairness, formality, equality,
and even elegance, except that the star witness in this courtly event was the
confession extracted back at the gatehouse. Indeed, this reality led the
32 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 19-36 (Howard ed. 1965).
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Warren Court to pronounce the Miranda rule to bring a modicum of control
over the gatehouse. The more the Court takes its eye off the initial stages
of police-suspect confrontation, the less likely any renovations to the
mansionhouse will make any real difference. And the Court that takes its
eye off is not passive-it is driving outcomes.
IV. THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
Students in Criminal Procedure learn quickly that while the term
"totality of the circumstances" is a product of an earlier Court, the current
Court has turned it into an art form. Often the Court is confronted with
important questions such as these: (1) When does police coercion reach the
point where it produces "involuntary" confessions?; (2) When does a delay
in bringing a defendant to trial violate his right to a "speedy trial?"; (3)
When does police conduct become overreaching so as to vitiate a person's
"consent" to search?; (4) When does the method of conducting a police line-
up reach the point when it produces not an accurate identification from a
witness but a mere ratification by the witness of the police's predetermined
result?; and many, many others like these. The Warren Court's approach
was to take firm control over questions like these by pronouncing single-
factor, prophylactic rules such as Miranda. You want to interrogate a
suspect?-First give him these warnings. No exceptions. "But," a
prosecutor might say in a subsequent case before the Court, "in this
particular case, your Honors, the suspect had authored a five-volume
treatise on the Fifth Amendment, so we feel that giving the warnings would
have been silly and redundant." The Warren Court simply said, "Sorry, the
rule admits no exceptions. Not up to you, not up to the trial court, not up
to the police, not up to the states or lower federal courts, up to us." The
Rehnquist Court, on the other hand, has answered all of the critical
questions recited above and many others like them by saying that the
answer "depends." It depends, specifically, on an analysis of a "totality of
the circumstances."
Initially, of course, this sounds quite sensible. None of us when
confronted with an important life choice would want to resolve it with
reference to, say, "sixty-five percent of the circumstances." Yet, when
Supreme Court justices propound a multi-factor balancing test, they are in
reality paving the way for a commitment of the question's answer to
someone else. When this Court propounds balancing tests, it never tells
us what anything weighs! That is left to someone else. And so the critical
decisions now rest in the sound discretion of whom? Not the highest court
in the land, but, initially in the police, then in the lowest courts. Every day,
trial judges, both state and federal, make these determinations which are
often invulnerable to appeal because of cost and delay, because of the
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"harmless error" doctrine, and because decisions made under an
underdefined balancing test are almost always impossible to prove wrong.
Is this judicial passivism? Is this the product of a liberal, democratic
ideal which wants to spread the discretion around? Of course, it could be,
but one suspects that the Court knows very well how trial judges will
usually resolve these questions. Most of those judges are in state courts
with a watchful local audience. Many of them are elected for relatively
short terms by a population sold on both the fact and fear of crime. All of
them are confronted by "repeat players" from the prosecutor's office, and
many feel great pressure to avoid alienating the local police. Some trial-
court judges view themselves as guardians of local police morale. And, in
their defense, these trial judges know one more thing that often gets
overlooked. When an error is made to a criminal defendant's disadvantage,
there is at least theoretically a cure for it through appeal. When an error is
made to the prosecutor's disadvantage, the Double Jeopardy Clause renders
it permanent. Most of us prefer to make the least dangerous mistake. It is
particularly cruel that these volatile questions are forced upon local trial
judges by a Court itself ingeniously and carefully insulated from public
clamor through life tenure and through residence in a place and milieu
about as accessible to most Americans as Neptune.
V. CONCLUSION
The net effect, if not the motivation, of all of the Court's recent action
which I have presented today is to add bricks on the crime control side of
the scale (or to take bricks away from the due-process side, if you want--it
amounts to the same thing). Many would applaud this result. We are,
admittedly, all concerned with the havoc wrought by crime. Many crave
greater crime enforcement. And if an initiative for tougher crime
enforcement came from the executive or legislative branches, although we
might personally think it a wise or unwise initiative, we would all
understand that the political branches were designed to consider all like
suggestions and to act in what they discerned was the majority's best
interest. When the majority doesn't like what the political branches do or
don't do, they can, after all, "kick the rascals out." When the majority does
like what they do, APPLAUSE, APPLAUSE!
But when results applauded by the majority because they elevate crime
control over interests underlying constitutional guarantees are traceable not
to a political branch but to the one institution designed to be counter-
majoritarian, to the one institution designed to defend enduring ideas from
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the transient opinion of the day, to the one institution designed to stand
with the accused and often despised individual against the awesome power
of the state and its clamorous people, we had better hope that the applause
does not become an ovation.
A Postscript
The paper that I have just read seemed to me when I finished it one
better read on the last day of last term for it constitutes a looking back. And
not a particularly happy look either. But today we look ahead as well. First
Monday is to courtwatchers as Spring Training is to Cub fans, except that,
perhaps unfortunately, the Court doesn't decide any "exhibition cases" that
do not count in the standings. And just as Cub fans are ennobled by their
ability to discount all the tragicomedies of the past and shaky prospects for
the future and imagine unimaginable ecstasy in the coming year, we too
would do well to remember that on any given day, the Court can, and still
sometimes does, make us proud of the Constitution, proud of the team.
Cub fans can trace their indomitable spirit at least as far back as the beloved
Ernie Banks. And while none of us saw him play, all Americans can trace
their constitutional lineage back to that great little scrapper, Jimmy
Madison.
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